

Computational interpretation of proofs: Classical realizability


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Semantics of proofs and certified mathematics
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What is classical realizability?

- Complete reformulation of the principles of Kleene realizability to take into account **classical reasoning**
 - Based on Griffin's discovery about the connection between classical reasoning and **control operators** (call/cc)

$$\text{call/cc} : ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A \quad (\text{Peirce's law})$$

- Interprets the **axiom of dependent choices** (DC)
- Initially designed for PA2 (+ DC), but extends to:
 - Higher-order arithmetic (PA_ω)
 - Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF)
 - The calculus of constructions with universes (with classical logic in Prop)

- Deep connections with **Cohen forcing** (3rd lecture)

Plan

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The λ_c -calculus
- 3 Second-order logic
- 4 Realizability interpretation
- 5 Realizing the axioms of $PA2^-$
- 6 Witness extraction

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Terms, stacks and processes

- Syntax of the language parameterized by
 - A countable set $\mathcal{K} = \{\alpha; \dots\}$ of **instructions**, containing at least the instruction α (**call/cc**)
 - A countable set Π_0 of **stack constants** (or **stack bottoms**)

Terms, stacks and processes

Terms	$t, u ::= x \mid \lambda x . t \mid tu \mid \kappa \mid k_\pi$	$(\kappa \in \mathcal{K})$
Stacks	$\pi, \pi' ::= \alpha \mid t \cdot \pi$	$(\alpha \in \Pi_0, t \text{ closed})$
Processes	$p, q ::= t \star \pi$	$(t \text{ closed})$

- A λ -calculus with two kinds of constants:
 - Instructions $\kappa \in \mathcal{K}$, including α
 - **Continuation constants** k_π , one for every stack π (generated by α)
- **Notation:** $\Lambda, \Pi, \Lambda \star \Pi$ (sets of closed terms / stacks / processes)

Proof-like terms

- **Proof-like term** \equiv Term containing no continuation constant

Proof-like terms $t, u ::= x \mid \lambda x . t \mid tu \mid \kappa \quad (\kappa \in \mathcal{K})$

- **Idea:** All realizers coming from actual proofs are of this form, continuation constants κ_π are treated as **paraproofs**
- **Notation:** $\text{PL} \equiv$ set of closed proof-like terms
- Natural numbers encoded as proof-like terms by:

Krivine numerals $\bar{n} \equiv \bar{s}^n \bar{0} \in \text{PL} \quad (n \in \mathbb{N})$

writing $\bar{0} \equiv \lambda xy . x$ and $\bar{s} \equiv \lambda nxy . y (n x y)$

- **Note:** Krivine numerals $\not\equiv$ Church numerals, but β -equivalent

The Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM)

(1/2)

- We assume that the set $\Lambda \star \Pi$ comes with a preorder $p \succ p'$ of **evaluation** satisfying the following rules:

Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM)

Push

$$tu \star \pi \quad \succ \quad t \star u \cdot \pi$$

Grab

$$\lambda x . t \star u \cdot \pi \quad \succ \quad t\{x := u\} \star \pi$$

Save

$$\alpha \star u \cdot \pi \quad \succ \quad u \star k_\pi \cdot \pi$$

Restore

$$k_\pi \star u \cdot \pi' \quad \succ \quad u \star \pi$$

...

...

(+ reflexivity & transitivity)

- Evaluation not defined but **axiomatized**. The preorder $p \succ p'$ is another parameter of the calculus, just like the sets \mathcal{K} and Π_0
- Extensible machinery**: can add extra instructions and rules (We shall see examples later)

The Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM)

(2/2)

- Rules **Push** and **Grab** implement **weak head β -reduction** (**call-by-name** strategy):

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{Push} \qquad tu \star \pi \quad \succ \quad t \star u \cdot \pi \\
 \text{Grab} \qquad \lambda x . t \star u \cdot \pi \quad \succ \quad t\{x := u\} \star \pi
 \end{array}$$

- Rules **Save** and **Restore** implement **backtracking**:

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \text{Save} \qquad \alpha \star u \cdot \pi \quad \succ \quad u \star k_\pi \cdot \pi \\
 \text{Restore} \qquad k_\pi \star u \cdot \pi' \quad \succ \quad u \star \pi
 \end{array}$$

- Instruction α creates continuation constants k_π :

Usage: $\alpha(\lambda k . t)$

Intuition: $\text{let } k = \text{curr-cont}() \text{ in } t$

Computation: $\alpha(\lambda k . t) \star \pi \succ t\{k := k_\pi\} \cdot \pi$

- Continuation constant k_π restores the saved context π

Examples of extra instructions

(1/2)

- The instruction **quote**

$$\text{quote} \star t \cdot u \cdot \pi \succ u \star \overline{[t]} \cdot \pi$$

where $t \mapsto [t]$ is a fixed bijection from Λ to \mathbb{N}

- Useful to realize the **axiom of dependent choices** [Krivine'03]
- The instruction **eq**

$$\text{eq} \star t_1 \cdot t_2 \cdot u \cdot v \cdot \pi \succ \begin{cases} u \star \pi & \text{if } t_1 \equiv t_2 \\ v \star \pi & \text{if } t_1 \not\equiv t_2 \end{cases}$$

- Tests syntactic equality $t_1 \equiv t_2$
- Can be implemented using quote
- The instruction **\pitchfork (fork)**

$$\pitchfork \star u \cdot v \cdot \pi \succ \begin{cases} u \star \pi \\ v \star \pi \end{cases}$$

- Non deterministic choice operator**
- Useful for pedagogy – bad for realizability (collapses to forcing)

Examples of extra instructions

(2/2)

- The instruction **stop**:

$$\text{stop} \star \pi \not\approx$$

Stops execution. Final result returned on the stack π

- The instruction **print**:

$$\text{print} \star \bar{n} \cdot u \cdot \pi \succ u \star \pi \quad (\text{formal specification})$$

and prints integer n on standard output (informal specification)

\rightsquigarrow Displays intermediate results without stopping the machine
(poor man's side effect)

- The instruction **make_coffee**:

$$\text{make_coffee} \star u \cdot \pi \succ u \star \pi \quad + \quad \text{makes coffee}$$

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The language of (minimal) second-order logic

- Second-order logic deals with two kinds of objects:
 - 1st-order objects = **individuals** (i.e. basic objects of the theory)
 - 2nd-order objects = **k -ary relations** over individuals

First-order terms and formulas

First-order terms

$$e, e' ::= x \mid f(e_1, \dots, e_k)$$

Formulas

$$A, B ::= X(e_1, \dots, e_k) \mid A \Rightarrow B \\ \mid \forall x A \mid \forall X A$$

- Two kinds of variables
 - 1st-order vars: x, y, z, \dots (not to be confused with λ -variables!)
 - 2nd-order vars: X, Y, Z, \dots of all arities $k \geq 0$
- Two kinds of substitution:
 - 1st-order subst.: $e\{x := e_0\}, A\{x := e_0\}$ (defined as usual)
 - 2nd-order subst.: $A\{X := P_0\}, P\{X := P_0\}$ (postponed)

First-order terms

- Defined from a **first order signature** Σ (as usual):

First-order terms

$$e, e' ::= x \mid f(e_1, \dots, e_k)$$

- f ranges over k -ary function symbols in Σ
- In what follows we assume that:
 - Each k -ary function symbol f is interpreted in \mathbb{N} by a function
$$f^{\mathbb{N}} : \mathbb{N}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$
 - The signature Σ contains a function symbol for every primitive recursive function: $0, s, +, \times, \uparrow, \dots$
- Denotation (in \mathbb{N}) of a closed first-order term e written $\llbracket e \rrbracket$

Formulas

- Formulas of **minimal second-order logic**

Formulas

$$A, B ::= X(e_1, \dots, e_k) \mid A \Rightarrow B \\ \mid \forall x A \mid \forall X A$$

only based on implication and 1st/2nd-order universal quantification

- Other connectives/quantifiers are defined (**second-order encodings**)

$$\perp \equiv \forall Z Z \quad \text{(absurdity)}$$

$$\neg A \equiv A \Rightarrow \perp \quad \text{(negation)}$$

$$A \wedge B \equiv \forall Z ((A \Rightarrow B \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z) \quad \text{(conjunction)}$$

$$A \vee B \equiv \forall Z ((A \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow (B \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z) \quad \text{(disjunction)}$$

$$\exists x A(x) \equiv \forall Z (\forall x (A(x) \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z) \quad \text{(1st-order } \exists \text{)}$$

$$\exists X A(X) \equiv \forall Z (\forall X (A(X) \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z) \quad \text{(2nd-order } \exists \text{)}$$

$$e_1 = e_2 \equiv \forall Z (Z(e_1) \Rightarrow Z(e_2)) \quad \text{(Leibniz equality)}$$

Predicates

- 2nd-order variables represent unknown (abstract) relations
- Concrete relations are represented using **predicates** (syntactic sugar)

Predicates

$$P, Q ::= \hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_k A$$

(of arity k)

- Let $P \equiv \hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_k A$
 - Variables x_1, \dots, x_n (pairwise \neq) are the **arguments** of P
 - Other free variables of formula A are the **parameters** of P
 - **Notation:** $FV(P) = FV(A) \setminus \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$ (free vars = params)
- Predicates are subject to α -conversion (\hat{x}_i s treated as binders)
- 0-ary predicates are formulas

Predicate application / substitution

- Partial/total application of $P \equiv \hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_k A$ to e_1, \dots, e_ℓ :

$$P(e_1, \dots, e_\ell) \equiv \hat{x}_{\ell+1} \cdots \hat{x}_k A \{x_1 := e_1; \dots; x_\ell := e_\ell\} \quad (\ell \leq k)$$

where $x_j \notin FV(e_i)$ for $i \in [1..\ell], j \in [\ell+1..k]$

Result is a $(k - \ell)$ -ary predicate, and a formula if $k = \ell$

- Every k -ary 2nd-order variable may be viewed as a predicate:

$$X \equiv \hat{x}_1 \cdots \hat{x}_k X(x_1, \dots, x_k)$$

- Second-order substitution (X, P of same arity)

$$(X(e_1, \dots, e_k))\{X := P\} \equiv P(e_1, \dots, e_k)$$

- In a formula: $A\{X := P\}$
- In a predicate: $Q\{X := P\}$

Unary predicates as sets

- Unary predicates represent **sets of individuals**

Syntactic sugar: $\{x : A\} \equiv \hat{x}A, \quad e \in P \equiv P(e)$

Example: The set \mathbb{IN} of Dedekind numerals

$$\mathbb{IN} \equiv \{x : \forall Z (0 \in Z \Rightarrow \forall y (y \in Z \Rightarrow s(y) \in Z) \Rightarrow x \in Z)\}$$

- Relativized quantifications:

$$(\forall x \in P) A(x) \equiv \forall x (x \in P \Rightarrow A(x))$$

$$\begin{aligned} (\exists x \in P) A(x) &\equiv \forall Z (\forall x (x \in P \Rightarrow A(x) \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z) \\ &\Leftrightarrow \exists x (x \in P \wedge A(x)) \end{aligned}$$

- Inclusion and extensional equality:

$$P \subseteq Q \equiv \forall x (x \in P \Rightarrow x \in Q)$$

$$P = Q \equiv \forall x (x \in P \Leftrightarrow x \in Q)$$

- Set constructors: $P \cup Q \equiv \{x : x \in P \vee x \in Q\}$ (etc.)

A type system for second-order logic (λNK2)

- Use proof-like terms as **Curry-style proof terms**
Represent the computational contents of classical proofs

- Typing judgement:** $\underbrace{x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n}_{\text{typing context } \Gamma} \vdash t : B$

Typing rules

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash x : A} \quad (x:A) \in \Gamma$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, x : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. t : A \Rightarrow B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A\{x := e\}}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X A} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A\{X := P\}}$$

$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \alpha : ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A}$$

Typing examples

- Intuitionistic principles:

$$\mathbf{pair} \equiv \lambda xyz. z x y \quad : \quad \forall X \forall Y (X \Rightarrow Y \Rightarrow X \wedge Y)$$

$$\mathbf{fst} \equiv \lambda z. z (\lambda xy. x) \quad : \quad \forall X \forall Y (X \wedge Y \Rightarrow X)$$

$$\mathbf{snd} \equiv \lambda z. z (\lambda xy. y) \quad : \quad \forall X \forall Y (X \wedge Y \Rightarrow Y)$$

$$\mathbf{refl} \equiv \lambda z. z \quad : \quad \forall x (x = x)$$

$$\mathbf{trans} \equiv \lambda xyz. y (x z) \quad : \quad \forall x \forall y \forall z (x = y \Rightarrow y = z \Rightarrow x = z)$$

- Excluded middle, double negation elimination:

$$\mathbf{left} \equiv \lambda xuv. u x \quad : \quad \forall X \forall Y (X \Rightarrow X \vee Y)$$

$$\mathbf{right} \equiv \lambda yuv. v y \quad : \quad \forall X \forall Y (Y \Rightarrow X \vee Y)$$

$$\mathbf{EM} \equiv \alpha (\lambda k. \mathbf{right} (\lambda x. k (\mathbf{left} x))) \quad : \quad \forall X (X \vee \neg X)$$

$$\mathbf{DNE} \equiv \lambda z. \alpha (\lambda k. z k) \quad : \quad \forall X (\neg \neg X \Rightarrow X)$$

- De Morgan laws:

$$\lambda zy. z (\lambda x. yx) \quad : \quad \exists x A(x) \Rightarrow \neg \forall x \neg A(x)$$

$$\lambda zy. \alpha (\lambda k. z (\lambda x. k (y x))) \quad : \quad \neg \forall x \neg A(x) \Rightarrow \exists x A(x)$$

Classical second-order logic: PA2

System λ NK2 defines provability in *classical 2nd-order logic* (NK2).
For *classical 2nd-order arithmetic* (PA2), add the following axioms:

- Defining equations of primitive recursive functions:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \forall x (x + 0 = x) & \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y)) \\ \forall x (x \times 0 = 0) & \forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = x \times y + x) \end{array} \quad (\text{etc.})$$

- Peano 3rd and 4th axioms:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{(P3)} \quad \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y) \\ \text{(P4)} \quad \forall x \neg(s(x) = 0) \end{array}$$

- The induction axiom:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Ind} \quad \equiv \quad \forall x (x \in \mathbf{IN}) \\ \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \forall Z [0 \in Z \Rightarrow \forall y (y \in Z \Rightarrow s(y) \in Z) \Rightarrow \forall x (x \in Z)] \end{array}$$

The induction axiom

- **Problem:** The induction axiom is not realizable!

$$\text{Ind} \equiv \forall x (x \in \mathbb{N})$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \forall Z [0 \in Z \Rightarrow \forall y (y \in Z \Rightarrow s(y) \in Z) \Rightarrow \forall x (x \in Z)]$$

- **Solution:** Relativize all 1st-order quantifications to \mathbb{N} :

Non relativized

$$\forall x A(x) \rightsquigarrow$$

$$\exists x A(x) \rightsquigarrow$$

$$\forall Z (\forall x (A(x) \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z)$$

Relativized

$$(\forall x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$$

$$\forall x (x \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow A(x))$$

$$(\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$$

$$\forall Z (\forall x (x \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow A(x) \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z)$$

Theorem

If $\text{PA2} \vdash A$, then $\text{PA2} - \text{Ind} \vdash A^{\mathbb{N}}$

($A^{\mathbb{N}} \equiv A$ relativized to \mathbb{N})

Computational contents of relativization

- **Intuition:**

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\forall x \in \mathbb{IN}) A(x) &\equiv \forall x (x \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow A(x)) \\
 &\approx (\prod x \in \text{nat}) A(x) \qquad (\text{Coq, Agda})
 \end{aligned}$$

- Recall: $x \in \mathbb{IN} \equiv \forall Z [Z(0) \Rightarrow \forall y (Z(y) \Rightarrow Z(s(y))) \Rightarrow Z(x)]$

$\bar{0}$	$\equiv \lambda z f . fz$:	$0 \in \mathbb{IN}$
\bar{s}	$\equiv \lambda n z f . f (n z f)$:	$(\forall x \in \mathbb{IN}) s(x) \in \mathbb{IN}$
\bar{n}	$\equiv \bar{s}^n \bar{0}$:	$n \in \mathbb{IN}$
plus	$\equiv \lambda n m . m n \bar{s}$:	$(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{IN}) x + y \in \mathbb{IN}$
mult	$\equiv \lambda n m . m \bar{0} (\lambda p . \text{plus } p n)$:	$(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{IN}) x \times y \in \mathbb{IN}$
(etc.)			

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Classical realizability: principles

- **Intuitions:**

- term = “proof” / stack = “counter-proof”
- process = “contradiction” (slogan: never trust a classical realizer!)

- Classical realizability model parameterized by a pole $\perp\!\!\!\perp$
= set of processes closed under anti-evaluation (or saturated)

$$\text{If } p \succ p' \text{ and } p' \in \perp\!\!\!\perp, \text{ then } p \in \perp\!\!\!\perp$$

- Each formula A is interpreted as two sets:

- A set of stacks $\|A\|$ (falsity value)
- A set of terms $|A|$ (truth value)

- Falsity value $\|A\|$ defined by induction on A (negative interpretation)

- Truth value $|A|$ defined by orthogonality:

$$|A| = \|A\|^\perp = \{t \in \Lambda : \forall \pi \in \|A\| \ t \star \pi \in \perp\!\!\!\perp\}$$

Architecture of the realizability model

- The realizability model \mathcal{M}_{\perp} is defined from:
 - The full standard model \mathcal{M} of PA2: the **ground model** (but we could take any model \mathcal{M} of PA2 as well)
 - An instance $(\mathcal{K}, \Pi_0, \succ)$ of the λ_c -calculus
 - A saturated set of processes $\perp \subseteq \Lambda \star \Pi$ (the **pole**)
- Architecture:
 - First-order terms/variables interpreted as **natural numbers** $n \in \mathbb{N}$
 - Formulas interpreted as **falsity values** $S \in \wp(\Pi)$
 - k -ary 2nd-order variables (and k -ary predicates) interpreted as **falsity functions** $F : \mathbb{N}^k \rightarrow \wp(\Pi)$.

Formulas with parameters

$$A, B ::= \dots \mid \dot{F}(e_1, \dots, e_k)$$

Add a predicate constant \dot{F} for every falsity function $\dot{F} : \mathbb{N}^k \rightarrow \wp(\Pi)$

Interpreting closed formulas with parameters

Let A be a closed formula (with parameters)

- Falsity value $\|A\|$ defined by induction on A :

$$\|\dot{F}(e_1, \dots, e_n)\| = F(\llbracket e_1 \rrbracket, \dots, \llbracket e_n \rrbracket)$$

$$\|A \Rightarrow B\| = |A| \cdot \|B\| = \{t \cdot \pi : t \in |A|, \pi \in \|B\|\}$$

$$\|\forall x A\| = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \|A\{x := n\}\|$$

$$\|\forall X A\| = \bigcup_{F: \mathbb{N}^k \rightarrow \mathfrak{P}(\Pi)} \|A\{X := \dot{F}\}\|$$

- Truth value $|A|$ defined by orthogonality:

$$|A| = \|A\|^\perp = \{t \in \Lambda : \forall \pi \in \|A\| \quad t \star \pi \in \perp\}$$

The realizability relation

Falsity value $\perp\!\!\!\perp$ and truth value \top depend on the pole $\perp\!\!\!\perp$

\rightsquigarrow write them (sometimes) $\perp\!\!\!\perp$ and \top to recall the dependency

Realizability relations

$$t \Vdash A \equiv t \in \top \quad (\text{Realizability w.r.t. } \perp\!\!\!\perp)$$

$$t \Vdash\!\!\!\Vdash A \equiv \forall \perp\!\!\!\perp \ t \in \top \quad (\text{Universal realizability})$$

From computation to realizability

(1/2)

Fundamental idea: The computational behavior of a term determines the formula(s) it realizes:

Example 1: A closed term t is **identity-like** if:

$$t \star u \cdot \pi \succ u \star \pi \quad \text{for all } u \in \Lambda, \pi \in \Pi$$

Proposition

If t is identity-like, then $t \Vdash \forall X (X \Rightarrow X)$

Proof: Exercise! (Remark: converse implication holds – exercise!)

- Examples of identity-like terms:

- $\lambda x . x, (\lambda x . x)(\lambda x . x),$ etc.
- $\lambda x . \alpha \lambda k . x, \lambda x . \alpha \lambda k . k x, \lambda x . \alpha \lambda k . k x (\delta \delta),$ etc.
- $\lambda x . \text{marshal } x \lambda n . \text{unmarshal } n (\lambda z . z)$

From computation to realizability

(2/2)

Example 2: Control operators:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathfrak{c} \star t \cdot \pi & \succ t \star k_\pi \cdot \pi \\ k_\pi \star t \cdot \pi' & \succ t \star \pi \end{array}$$

- “Typing” k_π :

$$k_\pi \star t \cdot \pi' \succ t \star \pi$$

Lemma

If $\pi \in \llbracket A \rrbracket$, then $k_\pi \Vdash A \Rightarrow B$ (B any)

Proof: Exercise

- “Typing” \mathfrak{c} :

$$\mathfrak{c} \star t \cdot \pi \succ t \star k_\pi \cdot \pi$$

Proposition (Peirce’s law)

$\mathfrak{c} \Vdash ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A$

Proof: Exercise

Adequacy

(1/2)

Aim: Prove the theorem of adequacy:

$t : A$ (in the sense of λ NK2) implies $t \Vdash A$ (in the sense of realizability)

- Closing typing judgments $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : A$
 - We close logical objects (1st-order terms, formulas, predicates) using semantic objects (natural numbers, falsity values, falsity functions)
 - We close proof-terms using realizers

Definition (Valuations)

- 1 A **valuation** is a function ρ such that:
 - $\rho(x) \in \mathbb{N}$ for each 1st-order variable x
 - $\rho(X) : \mathbb{N}^k \rightarrow \mathfrak{P}(\Pi)$ for each 2nd-order variable X of arity k
- 2 Closure of A with ρ written $A[\rho]$ (formula with parameters)

Adequacy

(2/2)

Definition (Adequate judgment, adequate rule)

Given a fixed pole $\perp\!\!\!\perp$:

- 1 A judgment $x_1 : A_1, \dots, x_n : A_n \vdash t : A$ is **adequate** if for every valuation ρ and for all $u_1 \Vdash A_1[\rho], \dots, u_n \Vdash A_n[\rho]$ we have:

$$t\{x_1 := u_1, \dots, x_n := u_n\} \Vdash A[\rho]$$

- 2 A typing rule is adequate if it preserves the property of adequacy (from the premises to the conclusion of the rule)

Theorem

- 1 All typing rules of λNK2 are adequate
- 2 All derivable judgments of λNK2 are adequate

Corollary: If $\vdash t : A$ (A closed formula), then $t \Vdash A$

Extending adequacy to subtyping

Definition (Adequate subtyping judgment)

Judgment $A \leq B$ **adequate** $\equiv \|B[\rho]\| \subseteq \|A[\rho]\|$ (for all valuations ρ)

Remark: Implies: $|A[\rho]| \subseteq |B[\rho]|$ (for all ρ), but strictly stronger

Adequate typing/subtyping rules

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \frac{}{A \leq A} \quad \frac{A \leq B \quad B \leq C}{A \leq C} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \quad A \leq B}{\Gamma \vdash t : B} \\
 \\
 \frac{}{\forall x A \leq A\{x := e\}} \quad \frac{}{\forall X A \leq A\{X := P\}} \\
 \\
 \frac{A \leq B}{A \leq \forall x B} \quad x \notin FV(A) \quad \frac{A \leq B}{A \leq \forall X B} \quad x \notin FV(A) \quad \frac{A' \leq A \quad B \leq B'}{A \Rightarrow B \leq A' \Rightarrow B'} \\
 \\
 \frac{}{\forall x (A \Rightarrow B) \leq A \Rightarrow \forall x B} \quad x \notin FV(A) \quad \frac{}{\forall X (A \Rightarrow B) \leq A \Rightarrow \forall X B} \quad x \notin FV(A)
 \end{array}$$

- Example: $\underbrace{\forall X \forall Y (((X \Rightarrow Y) \Rightarrow X) \Rightarrow X)}_{\text{Peirce's law}} \leq \underbrace{\forall X (\neg\neg X \Rightarrow X)}_{\text{DNE}}$

Anatomy of the model

(1/2)

- **Denotation of universal quantification:**

Falsity value: $\|\forall x A\| = \bigcup_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \|A\{x := n\}\|$ (by definition)

Truth value: $|\forall x A| = \bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} |A\{x := n\}|$ (by orthogonality)

(and similarly for 2nd-order universal quantification)

- **Denotation of implication:**

Falsity value: $\|A \Rightarrow B\| = |A| \cdot \|B\|$ (by definition)

Truth value: $|A \Rightarrow B| \subseteq |A| \rightarrow |B|$ (by orthogonality)

writing $|A| \rightarrow |B| = \{t \in \Lambda : \forall u \in |A| \ tu \in |B|\}$ (realizability arrow)

- 1 Converse inclusion does not hold in general, unless \perp closed under **Push**
- 2 In all cases: If $t \in |A| \rightarrow |B|$, then $\lambda x. tx \in |A \Rightarrow B|$ (η -expansion)

Anatomy of the model

(2/2)

- Falsity value $\perp\!\!\!\perp$ and truth value \top depend on the pole $\perp\!\!\!\perp$
 \rightsquigarrow write them $\perp\!\!\!\perp_{\perp\!\!\!\perp}$ and $\top_{\perp\!\!\!\perp}$ to recall the dependency
- **Degenerate case:** $\perp\!\!\!\perp = \emptyset$
 - Truth values can take only two values: \emptyset and \top
 - Classical realizability simply mimics the Tarski interpretation:

Degenerated interpretation

In the case where $\perp\!\!\!\perp = \emptyset$, for every closed formula A :

$$\top_{\perp\!\!\!\perp} = \begin{cases} \top & \text{if } \mathcal{M} \models A \\ \emptyset & \text{if } \mathcal{M} \not\models A \end{cases}$$

- **Non degenerate cases:** $\perp\!\!\!\perp \neq \emptyset$
 - Every truth value $\top_{\perp\!\!\!\perp}$ is inhabited:
 If $t_0 \star \pi_0 \in \perp\!\!\!\perp$, then $k_{\pi_0} t_0 \in \top_{\perp\!\!\!\perp}$ for all A (paraproof)
 - We shall only consider realizers that are **proof-like terms** ($\in \text{PL}$)

Provability, universal realizability and truth

- From what precedes:

① A provable \Rightarrow A universally realized (by a proof-like term)

② A universally realized \Rightarrow A true (in the standard model)

\rightsquigarrow Universal realizability: an intermediate notion
between provability and truth

- **Beware!**

Intuitionistic proofs of A	\subset	Classical proofs of A
\cap		\cap
Intuitionistic realizers of A	$\not\subset$ $\not\supseteq$	Classical realizers of A

Plan

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The λ_c -calculus
- 3 Second-order logic
- 4 Realizability interpretation
- 5 Realizing the axioms of PA2⁻**
- 6 Witness extraction

The axioms of PA2 (recall)

- Defining equations of primitive recursive functions:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \forall x (x + 0 = x) & \forall x \forall y (x + s(y) = s(x + y)) \\ \forall x (x \times 0 = 0) & \forall x \forall y (x \times s(y) = x \times y + x) \end{array} \quad (\text{etc.})$$

- Peano 3rd and 4th axioms:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{(P3)} \quad \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y) \\ \text{(P4)} \quad \forall x \neg(s(x) = 0) \end{array}$$

- The induction axiom:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Ind} \quad \equiv \quad \forall x (x \in \mathbb{N}) \\ \Leftrightarrow \quad \forall Z [0 \in Z \Rightarrow \forall y (y \in Z \Rightarrow s(y) \in Z) \Rightarrow \forall x (x \in Z)] \end{array}$$

- Beware!** Since induction is not realizable (in general), we work in $\text{PA2}^- = \text{PA2} - \text{Ind}$, relativizing all 1st-order \forall/\exists to \mathbb{N}

Realizing equalities

- Equality between individuals defined by:

$$e_1 = e_2 \equiv \forall Z (Z(e_1) \Rightarrow Z(e_2)) \quad (\text{Leibniz equality})$$

Denotation of Leibniz equality

Given two closed 1st-order terms e_1, e_2 (and a pole \perp)

$$\|e_1 = e_2\| = \begin{cases} \|\mathbf{1}\| = \{t \cdot \pi : (t \star \pi) \in \perp\} & \text{if } \llbracket e_1 \rrbracket = \llbracket e_2 \rrbracket \\ \|\top \Rightarrow \perp\| = \Lambda \cdot \Pi & \text{if } \llbracket e_1 \rrbracket \neq \llbracket e_2 \rrbracket \end{cases}$$

where $\mathbf{1} \equiv \forall Z (Z \Rightarrow Z)$ and $\top \equiv \dot{\circ}$

- Intuitions:
 - A realizer of a true equality (in the model) behaves as the identity function $\lambda z. z$
 - A realizer of a false equality (in the model) behaves as a point of backtrack (breakpoint)

Realizing Peano axioms

Corollary 1 (Realizing true equations)

If $\mathcal{M} \models \forall \vec{x} (e_1(\vec{x}) = e_2(\vec{x}))$ (truth in the ground model)

then $\lambda z . z \Vdash \forall \vec{x} (e_1(\vec{x}) = e_2(\vec{x}))$ (universal realizability)

Corollary 2

All the defining equations of the arithmetic function symbols (+, ×, ↑, etc.) are realized by $\lambda z . z$

Corollary 3 (Realizing Peano axioms)

$$\lambda z . z \Vdash \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y)$$

$$\lambda z . z (\lambda w . w) \Vdash \forall x \neg (s(x) = 0)$$

Remark: Corollary 3 generalizes to all the **Horn formulas** that are true in the ground model (using trivial realizers)

Program extraction

Extracting a program from a proof in PA2

If $\text{PA2} \vdash A$, then there is $t \in \text{PL}$ such that $t \Vdash A^{\mathbb{N}}$
 ($A^{\mathbb{N}}$ obtained from A by relativizing all 1st-order quantifications to \mathbb{N})

- **In practice:**

- Only apply the adequacy theorem to the **computationally relevant** parts of the proof
- For the computationally irrelevant parts (i.e. Horn formulas), use 'default realizers' \rightsquigarrow **realizer optimization**

- **Example 1:** $\lambda n m z . z \Vdash (\forall x, y \in \mathbb{N}) x + y = y + x$

- **Example 2:** Fermat's last theorem¹

$$(\forall x, y, z, n \in \mathbb{N}) (x \geq 1 \Rightarrow y \geq 1 \Rightarrow n \geq 3 \Rightarrow x^n + y^n \neq z^n)$$

1. realized by: $\lambda xyznuvw . u (v (w \mathbf{I}))$

Plan

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Some problems of classical realizability

1 The specification problem

Given a formula A , characterize its universal realizers from their computational behavior

Specifying Peirce's law [Guillermo-Miquel'12]

2 Witness extraction from classical realizers

(cf below)

3 Realizability algebras + Cohen forcing

(3rd lecture)

Realizability algebras: a program to well-order \mathbb{R} [Krivine'11]

Forcing as a program transformation [Miquel'11]

4 Models induced by classical realizability

What are the interesting formulas that are realized in \mathcal{M}_{\perp} that are not already true in the ground model \mathcal{M} ?

Realizability algebras II: new models of ZF + DC [Krivine'12]

The problem of witness extraction

- **Problem:** Extract a **witness** from a **universal realizer** (or a **proof**)

$$t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$$

i.e. some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $A(n)$ is true

- This is not always possible!

$$t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) ((x = 1 \wedge C) \vee (x = 0 \wedge \neg C))$$

(C = Continuum hypothesis, Goldbach's conjecture, etc.)

- Two possible compromises:
 - Intuitionistic logic: **restrict the shape of the realizer** t_0
(by only keeping intuitionistic reasoning principles)
 - Classical logic: **restrict the shape of the formula** $A(x)$
(typically: Δ_0^0 -formulas)

Storage operators

- The **call-by-value implication**:

Formulas

$A, B ::= \dots \mid \{e\} \Rightarrow A$

Semantics: $\|\{e\} \Rightarrow A\| = \{\bar{n} \cdot \pi : n = \llbracket e \rrbracket, \pi \in \|A\|\}$

- From the definition: $e \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow A \leq \{e\} \Rightarrow A$

so that: $\mathbb{I} \Vdash \forall x \forall Z ((x \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow (\{x\} \Rightarrow Z))$ (direct implication)

Definition (Storage operator)

A **storage operator** is a closed proof-like term M such that:

$M \Vdash \forall x \forall Z ((\{x\} \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow (x \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow Z))$ (converse implication)

- They exist, for instance: $M \equiv \lambda f n . n f (\lambda h x . h (\bar{s} x)) \bar{0}$
- Conclusion:** $e \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow A$ and $\{e\} \Rightarrow A$ interchangeable

Storage operators

- Intuitively, a storage operator

$$M \Vdash \forall x \forall Z ((\{x\} \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow (x \in \mathbf{IN} \Rightarrow Z))$$

is a proof-like term that is intended to be applied to

- a function f specified only on totally evaluated numerals (i.e. **intuitionistic integers**)
- a classical integer $t \Vdash n \in \mathbf{IN}$ (n arbitrary)

and that evaluates (or “smoothes”) the classical integer t into a value of the form \bar{n} before passing this value to f

- Alternative point of view:

$$M \Vdash \forall x (\{x\} \Rightarrow A(x)) \Rightarrow (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN}) A(x)$$

A property that holds for all values (i.e. intuitionistic integers) also holds for all classical integers

Computing with storage operators: an example

- Given a k -ary function f , we let:

$$\text{Total}(f) \quad \equiv \quad (\forall x_1 \in \mathbf{IN}) \cdots (\forall x_k \in \mathbf{IN}) (f(x_1, \dots, x_k) \in \mathbf{IN})$$

$$\text{Comput}(f) \quad \equiv \quad \forall x_1 \cdots \forall x_k \forall Z \quad [\{x_1\} \Rightarrow \cdots \Rightarrow \{x_k\} \Rightarrow \\ (\{f(x_1, \dots, x_k)\} \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z]$$

Theorem (Specification of the formula $\text{Comput}(f)$)

For all $t \in \Lambda$, the following assertions are equivalent:

- $t \Vdash \text{Comput}(f)$
- t **computes** f : for all $(n_1, \dots, n_k) \in \mathbf{IN}^k$, $u \in \Lambda$, $\pi \in \Pi$:

$$t \star \bar{n}_1 \cdots \bar{n}_k \cdot u \cdot \pi \quad \succ \quad u \star \overline{f(n_1, \dots, n_k)} \cdot \pi$$

- Using a storage operator M , we can build proof-like terms such that:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \xi_k & \Vdash & \text{Total}(f) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{Comput}(f) \\ \xi'_k & \Vdash & \text{Comput}(f) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{Total}(f) \end{array}$$

The naive extraction method

- A classical realizer $t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$ always evaluates to a pair **witness/justification**

Naive extraction

If $t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$, then there are $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $u \in \Lambda$ such that

$$t_0 \star M(\lambda xy. \text{stop } x \ y) \cdot \pi \succ \text{stop} \star \bar{n} \cdot u \cdot \pi$$

(w.r.t. a particular pole $\perp\!\!\!\perp$)

- But $n \in \mathbb{N}$ might be a **false witness** because the justification $u \Vdash A(n)$ is cheating! (i.e. u might contain hidden continuations)
- In the case where t_0 comes from an **intuitionistic proof**, extracted witness $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is always correct

Extraction in the Σ_1^0 -case

Extraction in the Σ_1^0 -case (+ display intermediate results)

If $t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N})(f(x) = 0)$, then

$$t_0 \star M(\lambda xy. \text{print } x \text{ } y \text{ (stop } x)) \cdot \pi \succ \text{stop} \star \bar{n} \cdot \pi$$

for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $f(n) = 0$

- Storage operator M used to evaluate 1st component
- 2nd component (y) used as a **breakpoint**
(Relies on the particular structure of equality realizers)
- Holds independently from the instruction set
- Supports any representation of numerals
(one have to implement the storage operator M accordingly)

Extraction in the Σ_n^0 -case

(1/2)

Definition (conditional refutation)

$r_A \in \Lambda$ is a **conditional refutation** of the predicate $A(x)$ if

For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\mathcal{M} \not\models A(n)$: $r_A \bar{n} \Vdash \neg A(n)$

- Such a conditional refutation can be constructed for every predicate $A(x)$ of 1st-order arithmetic

This result is a consequence of the:

Theorem [Krivine-Miquay]

For every formula A of 1st-order arithmetic, there exists a proof-like term t_A such that:

If $\mathcal{M} \models A$ then $t_A \Vdash A$

Extraction in the Σ_n^0 -case

(2/2)

The Kamikaze extraction method

Let

- 1 $t_0 \Vdash (\exists x \in \mathbb{N}) A(x)$
- 2 r_A a conditional refutation of the predicate $A(x)$

Then the process

$$t_0 \star M(\lambda xy. \text{print } x (r_A x y)) \cdot \pi$$

displays a **correct witness** after finitely many evaluation steps

- **Remark:** No correctness invariant is ensured as soon as the (first) correct witness has been displayed!

After, everything may happen: crash, infinite loop, displaying incorrect witnesses, etc.

Primitive numerals

(1/2)

Extend the machine with the following instructions:

- For every integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$, an instruction $\hat{n} \in \mathcal{K}$ with no evaluation rule (i.e. inert constant).

Intuition: $\hat{n} \star \pi \succ$ segmentation fault

- An instruction null with the rules:

$$\text{null} \star \hat{n} \cdot u \cdot v \cdot \pi \succ \begin{cases} u \star \pi & \text{if } n = 0 \\ v \star \pi & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Instructions \check{f} with the rules:

$$\check{f} \star \hat{n}_1 \cdots \hat{n}_k \cdot u \cdot \pi \succ u \star \hat{m} \cdot \pi \quad \text{where } m = f(n_1, \dots, n_k)$$

for all the usual arithmetic operations

Primitive numerals

(2/2)

- Call-by-value implication, yet another definition:

Formulas $A, B ::= \dots \mid [e] \Rightarrow A$

Semantics: $\llbracket [e] \Rightarrow A \rrbracket = \{ \hat{n} \cdot \pi : n = \llbracket e \rrbracket, \pi \in \llbracket A \rrbracket \}$

- Redefining the set of natural numbers:

$$\mathbb{IN}' \equiv \{x : \forall Z (([e] \Rightarrow Z) \Rightarrow Z)\}$$

$$\text{box } x \equiv \lambda x r . r x \quad \Vdash \forall x ([x] \Rightarrow x \in \mathbb{IN}')$$

$$\text{box } \hat{n} \quad \Vdash n \in \mathbb{IN}'$$

$$\lambda n . n \lambda x . \check{s} x \text{ box} \quad \Vdash (\forall x \in \mathbb{IN}') s(x) \in \mathbb{IN}'$$

$$\lambda nm . n \lambda x . m \lambda y . (\check{+}) x y \text{ box} \quad \Vdash (\forall x, y \in \mathbb{IN}') x + y \in \mathbb{IN}'$$

$$\text{rec_cbv} \equiv \lambda z_0 z_s . \mathbf{Y} \lambda x r . \text{null } x z_0 (\text{pred } x \lambda y . z_s y (r y))$$

$$\Vdash \forall Z [Z(0) \Rightarrow \forall y ([y] \Rightarrow Z(y) \Rightarrow Z(s(y))) \Rightarrow \forall x ([x] \Rightarrow Z(x))]$$

$$\text{rec} \equiv \lambda z_0 z_s n . n \lambda x . \text{rec_cbv } z_0 (\lambda y z . z_s (\text{box } y) z) x$$

$$\Vdash \forall Z [Z(0) \Rightarrow (\forall y \in \mathbb{IN}') (Z(y) \Rightarrow Z(s(y))) \Rightarrow (\forall x \in \mathbb{IN}') Z(x)]$$

- Conclusion:** $\Vdash \forall x (x \in \mathbb{IN}' \Leftrightarrow x \in \mathbb{IN})$

Example: the minimum principle (in Coq)

Minimum principle (for an inhabited type T)

$$(\forall f : T \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) (\exists x : T) \underbrace{(\forall y : T) f(x) \leq f(y)}_{\text{undecidable}}$$

Proof: Reductio ad absurdum + course-by-value induction.

- **Remark:** No intuitionistic proof (oracle)

Corollary

$$(\forall f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) (\exists x : \mathbb{N}) \underbrace{f(x) \leq f(2x + 1)}_{\text{decidable}}$$

More generally: $(\forall f, g : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}) (\exists x : \mathbb{N}) f(x) \leq f(g(x))$

Proof. Take the point x given by the minimum principle.

Krivine's realizability vs the LRS R -translation (1/2)

- Krivine's realizability can be seen as the composition of the Lafont-Reus-Streicher (LRS) R -translation with Kleene's realizability

$$\text{CPS} \circ \text{Krivine} = \text{Kleene} \circ \text{LRS} \quad [\text{Oliva-Streicher'08}]$$

The dictionary

Classical realizability	LRS R -translation
Pole \perp	Return formula R
Falsity value $\ A\ $	Negative translation A^\perp
$\ A \Rightarrow B\ = A \cdot \ B\ $	$(A \Rightarrow B)^\perp \equiv A^{LRS} \wedge B^\perp$
Truth value $ A = \ A\ ^\perp$	$A^{LRS} \equiv A^\perp \Rightarrow R$


- Through the CPS translation, Krivine's extraction method in the Σ_1^0 -case is exactly Friedman's trick [Miquel'10]

Krivine's realizability vs the LRS R -translation (2/2)

Beware of reductionism!

- It only holds for *pure* classical reasoning
(extra instructions are not taken into account)
- Classical realizers are easier to understand than their CPS-translations (and more efficient...)
- Classical realizability is more than Kleene's realizability composed with the Lafont-Reus-Streicher R -translation!

An image:



but can we deduce the properties of *water* from the ones of H_2 and O_2 ?