

Kleene realizability and negative translations

Alexandre Miquel



UNIVERSIDAD
DE LA REPUBLICA
URUGUAY



FACULTAD DE
INGENIERIA



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Plan

- 1 Kleene realizability
- 2 Gödel-Gentzen negative translation
- 3 Uniformity and relativization
- 4 Lafont-Reus-Streicher negative translation

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Definition of the relation $t \Vdash A$ (recall)

- **Recall:** For each closed FO-term e , we write $e^{\mathbb{N}}$ its denotation in \mathbb{N}

Definition of the realizability relation $t \Vdash A$

(t, A closed)

$$t \Vdash \perp \quad \equiv \quad \perp$$

$$t \Vdash \top \quad \equiv \quad t \gamma^* 0$$

$$t \Vdash e_1 = e_2 \quad \equiv \quad e_1^{\mathbb{N}} = e_2^{\mathbb{N}} \wedge t \gamma^* 0$$

$$t \Vdash A \wedge B \quad \equiv \quad \exists t_1 \exists t_2 (t \gamma^* \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle \wedge t_1 \Vdash A \wedge t_2 \Vdash B)$$

$$t \Vdash A \vee B \quad \equiv \quad \exists u ((t \gamma^* \langle \bar{0}, u \rangle \wedge u \Vdash A) \vee (t \gamma^* \langle \bar{1}, u \rangle \wedge u \Vdash B))$$

$$t \Vdash A \Rightarrow B \quad \equiv \quad \forall u (u \Vdash A \Rightarrow tu \Vdash B)$$

$$t \Vdash \forall x A(x) \quad \equiv \quad \forall n (t \bar{n} \Vdash A(n))$$

$$t \Vdash \exists x A(x) \quad \equiv \quad \exists n \exists u (t \gamma^* \langle \bar{n}, u \rangle \wedge u \Vdash A(n))$$

Lemma (Closure under anti-reduction)

If $t \gamma^* t'$ and $t' \Vdash A$, then $t \Vdash A$

The main Theorem (recall)

Lemma (Adequacy)

Let $d : (A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B)$ be a derivation in NJ. Then:

- for all valuations $\rho : \text{FOVar} \rightarrow \mathbb{IN}$,
- for all realizers $t_1 \Vdash A_1[\rho], \dots, t_n \Vdash A_n[\rho]$,

we have: $d^*[\rho][z_1 := t_1, \dots, z_n := t_n] \Vdash B[\rho]$

writing d^* the λ -term extracted from the derivation d (following Curry-Howard)

Lemma

All axioms of HA are realized

Theorem (Soundness)

If $\text{HA} \vdash A$, then $t \Vdash A$ for some closed λ -term t

Harrop formulas

(2/2)

- To each (possibly open) Harrop formula H , we associate a closed λ -term t_H that is **computationally trivial**:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \tau_H & :\equiv 0 \quad (H \text{ atomic}) \\ \tau_{H_1 \wedge H_2} & :\equiv \langle \tau_{H_1}, \tau_{H_2} \rangle \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{ll} \tau_{A \Rightarrow H} & :\equiv \lambda _ . \tau_H \\ \tau_{\forall x H} & :\equiv \lambda _ . \tau_H \end{array}$$

Theorem

For all closed Harrop formulas H :

$$\text{If } H \text{ is realized, then } \tau_H \Vdash H$$

Moreover, all realizers of H are “computationally equivalent” to τ_H

- Intuition:** Harrop formulas have computationally irrelevant realizers, that can be replaced by the trivial realizers τ_H
 - Useful for optimizing **extracted programs** (cf next slide)
 - But shows that Harrop formulas are **computationally irrelevant**

Optimizing program extraction

(1/2)

Idea: While turning derivations into λ -terms, use Harrop realizers τ_H whenever possible (instead of following Curry-Howard)

⇒ **Optimized program extraction**

Definition (Optimized program extraction)

Each derivation $d : (\Gamma \vdash B)$ is turned into a λ -term d^{opt} as follows:

- If B is a Harrop formula, then $d^{\text{opt}} := \tau_B$
- Otherwise, follow Curry-Howard for the last rule:

$$\bullet \text{ If } d \equiv \frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d_1 \end{array}}{\Gamma, A \vdash C} \quad \Gamma \vdash A \Rightarrow C \quad \text{then } d^{\text{opt}} := \lambda z_A . d_1^{\text{opt}}$$

$$\bullet \text{ If } d \equiv \frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d_1 \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d_2 \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash A} \quad \Gamma \vdash B \quad \text{then } d^{\text{opt}} := d_1^{\text{opt}} d_2^{\text{opt}}$$

- etc.

Optimizing program extraction

(2/2)

Lemma (Adequacy of the optimized extraction)

Let $d : (A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B)$ be a derivation in NJ. Then for all valuations $\rho : \text{FOVar} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and for all realizers $t_1 \Vdash A_1[\rho], \dots, t_n \Vdash A_n[\rho]$, we have:

$$d^{\text{opt}}[\rho][z_1 := t_1, \dots, z_n := t_n] \Vdash B[\rho]$$

Example:

- Let $F := \forall x \forall y \forall z \forall n (n > 2 \Rightarrow x^n + y^n \neq z^n)$
(Fermat's last theorem, as a Harrop formula)

- Given a derivation $d \equiv \frac{\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \vdots d_I \quad \vdots d_F \\ \hline \vdash F \Rightarrow A \quad \vdash F \end{array} \right.}{\vdash A}$ (where A is not Harrop)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{we have: } d^{\text{opt}} &\equiv d_I^{\text{opt}} d_F^{\text{opt}} \equiv d_I^{\text{opt}} \tau_F \\ &\equiv d_I^{\text{opt}}(\lambda_{-, -, -, -, -, -.} 0) \Vdash A \end{aligned}$$

\Rightarrow Don't need to know the proof of Fermat's last theorem to realize A !

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How to cope with classical logic?

- Kleene realizability is **definitely incompatible with classical logic**:

Proposition

(cf previous talk)

$$\begin{array}{l} \not\vdash \quad \forall x (\text{Halt}(x) \vee \neg \text{Halt}(x)) \\ \text{any_term} \Vdash \quad \neg \forall x (\text{Halt}(x) \vee \neg \text{Halt}(x)) \end{array}$$

(The same holds for all variants of Kleene realizability)

- Two possible solutions:
 - 1 Compose Kleene realizability with a **negative translation** from classical logic (LK) to intuitionistic logic (LJ) (next slide)
 - 2 Reformulate the principles of realizability to make them compatible with classical logic: **Krivine classical realizability** (next talk)

The Gödel-Gentzen negative translation

- **Idea:** Turn positive constructions (atomic formulas, \vee , \exists) into negative constructions (\perp , \neg , \Rightarrow , \wedge , \forall) using De Morgan laws
- Every formula A is translated into a formula A^G defined by:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \top^G & :\equiv \top & \perp^G & :\equiv \perp \\
 (A \Rightarrow B)^G & :\equiv A^G \Rightarrow B^G & (e_1 = e_2)^G & :\equiv \neg\neg(e_1 = e_2) \\
 (A \wedge B)^G & :\equiv A^G \wedge B^G & (A \vee B)^G & :\equiv \neg(\neg A^G \wedge \neg B^G) \\
 (\forall x A)^G & :\equiv \forall x A^G & (\exists x A)^G & :\equiv \neg\forall x \neg A^G
 \end{array}$$

writing: $\neg A :\equiv A \Rightarrow \perp$

Theorem (Soundness)

- 1 LK $\vdash A^G \Leftrightarrow A$
- 2 If PA $\vdash A$, then HA $\vdash A^G$

Realizing translated formulas

- **Strategy:**

- ① Build a derivation d of A (in PA)
- ② Turn it into a derivation d^G of A^G (in HA)
- ③ Turn d^G into a Kleene realizer (program extraction)

- Does not work! Failure comes from:

Proposition (Realizability collapse)

For every closed formula A :

- ① A^G is a Harrop formula (computationally irrelevant)
- ② Kleene's semantics for A^G mimics Tarski's semantics for A :

$$A^G \text{ is realized} \quad \text{iff} \quad \tau_{A^G} \Vdash A^G \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{IN} \models A$$

Proof. By structural induction on A .

- **Conclusion:** Kleene \circ Gödel-Gentzen = Tarski (in IN)

Friedman's R -translation(called A -translation by Friedman)

- **Principle:** In Gödel-Gentzen translation, replace each occurrence of \perp (absurdity) by a fixed formula R , called the **return formula**

Note: The return formula R may contain free variables!

- Every formula A is translated into a formula A^F defined by:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \top^F & :\equiv \top & \perp^F & :\equiv R \\ (A \Rightarrow B)^F & :\equiv A^F \Rightarrow B^F & (e_1 = e_2)^F & :\equiv \neg_R \neg_R (e_1 = e_2) \\ (A \wedge B)^F & :\equiv A^F \wedge B^F & (A \vee B)^F & :\equiv \neg_R (\neg_R A^F \wedge \neg_R B^F) \\ (\forall x A)^F & :\equiv \forall x A^F & (\exists x A)^F & :\equiv \neg_R \forall x \neg_R A^F \\ & \text{(if } x \notin FV(R)) & & \text{(if } x \notin FV(R)) \end{array}$$

writing: $\neg_R A :\equiv A \Rightarrow R$

Theorem (Soundness)

If $PA \vdash A$, then $HA \vdash A^F$ (independently from the formula R)

Beware! The formulas A and A^F are no more classically equivalent (in general)

Π_2^0 -conservativity

(1/2)

The interest of Friedman's translation comes from the following:

Theorem (Π_2^0 -conservativity)

PA is a Π_2^0 -conservative extension of HA, that is:

$$\text{PA} \vdash \forall \vec{x} \exists \vec{y} f(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) = 0 \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{HA} \vdash \forall \vec{x} \exists \vec{y} f(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) = 0$$

for every primitive recursive function $f(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$

This more generally implies that:

$$\text{PA} \vdash \forall \vec{x} \exists \vec{y} A(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \quad \text{iff} \quad \text{HA} \vdash \forall \vec{x} \exists \vec{y} A(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$$

for every formula $A(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$ with bounded quantifications

Π_2^0 -conservativity

(2/2)

Proof. Assume that $PA \vdash \forall x \exists y f(x, y) = 0$.

Working with an unknown formula R , we observe that:

$$\begin{aligned} HA \vdash \forall x \neg_R \forall y \neg_R \neg_R \neg_R f(x, y) = 0 & \quad (\text{by } R\text{-translation}) \\ HA \vdash \forall x \neg_R \forall y \neg_R f(x, y) = 0 & \quad (\text{since } \neg_R \neg_R \neg_R \leftrightarrow_{LJ} \neg_R) \\ HA \vdash \neg_R \forall y \neg_R f(x_0, y) = 0 & \quad (\text{by } \forall\text{-elim, with } x_0 \text{ fresh}) \\ HA \vdash \forall y (f(x_0, y) = 0 \Rightarrow R) \Rightarrow R & \quad (\text{from the def. of } \neg_R) \end{aligned}$$

We now take: $R := \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0$ (Friedman's trick!)

From the def. of R , we have:

$$HA \vdash \forall y (f(x_0, y) = 0 \Rightarrow \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0) \Rightarrow \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0$$

But the premise of the above implication is provable

$$HA \vdash \forall y (f(x_0, y) = 0 \Rightarrow \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0) \quad (\text{by } \exists\text{-intro with } y_0 = y)$$

hence we get

$$\begin{aligned} HA \vdash \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0 & \quad (\text{by modus ponens}) \\ HA \vdash \forall x_0 \exists y_0 f(x_0, y_0) = 0 & \quad (\text{by } \forall\text{-intro}) \end{aligned}$$

The converse implication ($HA \vdash \dots$ implies $PA \vdash \dots$) is obvious. □

Realizing translated formulas, again

- **Strategy:**

- ① Build a derivation d of a Π_2^0 -formula A (in PA)
- ② Turn it into a derivation $F\text{-trick}(d^F)$ of A (in HA)
- ③ Turn $F\text{-trick}(d^F)$ into a Kleene realizer of A (program extraction)

- This technique perfectly works in practice. However:

- The formula A^F is **not a Harrop formula** (in general), even when A is.
Possible fix: Introduce specific optimization techniques, e.g.:

Refined Program Extraction

[Berger et al. 2001]

- The translation $A \mapsto A^F$ completely changes the structure of the underlying proof. **Possible fix:** cf next parts

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Uniform vs non-uniform quantifiers

(1/2)

- In the Curry-Howard correspondence (and in realizability), there are two different ways to interpret quantifiers:

	$\forall x A(x)$	$\exists x A(x)$
Non-uniform (Type Theory style) (Kleene realiz.)	$\prod_{x \in D} A(x)$ (type of dep. functions)	$\sum_{x \in D} A(x)$ (type of dep. pairs)
Uniform (ML/Haskell style)	$\bigcap_{x \in D} A(x)$ (intersection type)	$\bigcup_{x \in D} A(x)$ (union type)

- Remark:** Tarski/Kripke/Heyting/Cohen models do not distinguish the two interpretations: the difference only appears in realizability

Uniform vs non-uniform quantifiers

(2/2)

- 1st-, 2nd- and higher-order logic support both interpretations
(But uniform interpretation is more concise & natural)
- The same holds for impredicative set theories: ZF , IZF_C , IZF_R
- Arithmetic (PA/HA) only supports the non-uniform interpretation
(due to the induction principle)
- But in all cases, the non-uniform interpretation can be encoded from the uniform interpretation, using a relativization:

$$\text{(non-uniform)} \forall x A(x) \quad \equiv \quad \text{(uniform)} \forall x \underbrace{(D(x) \Rightarrow A(x))}_{\text{type of functions}}$$

$$\text{(non-uniform)} \exists x A(x) \quad \equiv \quad \text{(uniform)} \exists x \underbrace{(D(x) \wedge A(x))}_{\text{type of pairs}}$$

where $D(x)$ is a suitable relativization predicate (the **domain of quantification**)

- This is why we shall prefer the uniform interpretation (in what follows)

Uniformity in realizability

- Kleene realizability interprets quantifiers in a non-uniform way:

$$t \Vdash \forall x A(x) \equiv \forall n (t \bar{n} \Vdash A(n))$$

$$t \Vdash \exists x A(x) \equiv \exists n \exists u (t \succ^* \langle \bar{n}, u \rangle \wedge u \Vdash A(n))$$

- Realizers of $\forall x A(x)$ expect an argument (representing x)
 - Realizers of $\exists x A(x)$ bear a witness
- But realizability can also interpret quantifiers in a uniform way:

Definition of the **uniform realizability** relation $t \Vdash_u A$

$$t \Vdash_u \forall x A(x) \quad :\equiv \quad \forall n (t \Vdash_u A(n))$$

$$t \Vdash_u \exists x A(x) \quad :\equiv \quad \exists n (t \Vdash_u A(n))$$

(other clauses of the definition are the same as for \Vdash)

- Realizers of $\forall x A(x)$ do not expect an argument
 - Realizers of $\exists x A(x)$ do not bear a witness
- What does it change... in NJ? ... in HA?

The uniform interpretation of first-order logic

(1/3)

Recall:

- To prove the adequacy of the rules of NJ w.r.t. the relation $t \Vdash A$ (where \forall/\exists are interpreted non uniformly), we defined a translation

$$d : (A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B) \mapsto d^*$$

where the λ -term d^* depends on the proof variables z_{A_1}, \dots, z_{A_n} and on the free variables x_1, \dots, x_k of the sequent $A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B$

- The rules for quantifiers were translated as follows:

$$\left(\frac{\vdots d}{\Gamma \vdash A} \right)^* := \lambda x. d^* \qquad \left(\frac{\vdots d}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x A} \right)^* := d^* e^*$$

$$\left(\frac{\vdots d}{\Gamma \vdash A[x := e]} \right)^* := \langle e^*, d^* \rangle \qquad \left(\frac{\vdots d_1 \quad \vdots d_2}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x A \quad \Gamma, A \vdash B} \right)^* := \text{let } \langle x, z \rangle = d_1^* \text{ in } d_2^*$$

The uniform interpretation of first-order logic

(2/3)

- To prove the adequacy of the rules of NJ w.r.t. the relation $t \Vdash_{\mathfrak{U}} A$ (where \forall/\exists are interpreted **uniformly**), we define a new translation

$$d : (A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B) \mapsto d^\circ$$

where the λ -term d° only depends on the proof variables z_{A_1}, \dots, z_{A_n}

- The rules for quantifiers are now translated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d \\ \Gamma \vdash A \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x A} \right)^\circ &:= d^\circ & \left(\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d \\ \Gamma \vdash \forall x A \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash A[x := e]} \right)^\circ &:= d^\circ \\ \left(\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d \\ \Gamma \vdash A[x := e] \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash \exists x A} \right)^\circ &:= d^\circ & \left(\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ d_1 \quad \vdots \\ \Gamma \vdash \exists x A \quad \Gamma, A \vdash B \end{array}}{\Gamma \vdash B} \right)^\circ &:= \text{let } z = d_1^\circ \text{ in } d_2^\circ \end{aligned}$$

(the other cases of the definition are the same as for $d \mapsto d^*$)

- Remark:** d° does not depend on first-order variables
 \Rightarrow Witnesses are lost

The uniform interpretation of first-order logic

(3/3)

- We can now prove the:

Lemma (Adequacy w.r.t. the uniform interpretation)

Let $d : (A_1, \dots, A_n \vdash B)$ be a derivation in NJ. Then:

- for all valuations $\rho : \text{FOVar} \rightarrow \mathbb{IN}$,
- for all realizers $t_1 \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A_1[\rho], \dots, t_n \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A_n[\rho]$,

we have: $d^\circ[z_1 := t_1, \dots, z_n := t_n] \Vdash_{\bar{u}} B[\rho]$

Note that we do not need to apply the valuation ρ to the λ -term d° , since the latter does not depend on first-order variables

- **Conclusion:** 1st-order int. logic supports both interpretations:

Non-uniform: $\forall x A(x) \approx \prod_{x \in D} A(x)$ $\exists x A(x) \approx \sum_{x \in D} A(x)$
(Kleene)

Uniform: $\forall x A(x) \approx \bigcap_{x \in D} A(x)$ $\exists x A(x) \approx \bigcup_{x \in D} A(x)$
(without witnesses)

Uniformity and typing

Quantifiers also have their **uniform typing rules** (adequate w.r.t. \Vdash_U)

- Uniform typing rules for \forall :

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma) \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A[x := e]}$$

Note: \forall treated as an infinitary **intersection type**

- Uniform typing rules for \exists :

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A[x := e]}{\Gamma \vdash t : \exists x A} \qquad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : (\exists x A) \Rightarrow B}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x (A \Rightarrow B)} \quad x \notin FV(B)$$

Note: \exists treated as an infinitary **union type**.

Equivalently, its elimination rule can be replaced by:

- A left-rule of the form:
$$\frac{\Gamma, z : A, \Gamma' \vdash t : B}{\Gamma, z : \exists x A, \Gamma' \vdash t : B} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma, \Gamma', B)$$
- A subtyping rule:
$$(\exists x A) \Rightarrow B \leq \forall x (A \Rightarrow B) \quad (\text{if } x \notin FV(B))$$

Uniformly realizing the axioms of HA

Lemma (**Uniformly** realizing true Π_1^0 -formulas)

Let $e_1(\vec{x})$, $e_2(\vec{x})$ be FO-terms depending on free variables \vec{x} .

If $\mathbb{N} \models \forall \vec{x} (e_1(\vec{x}) = e_2(\vec{x}))$, then $0 \Vdash_{\mathbb{U}} \forall \vec{x} (e_1(\vec{x}) = e_2(\vec{x}))$

Since all defining equations of function symbols are Π_1^0 :

Corollary

All defining equations of function symbols are **uniformly** realized

Lemma (**Uniformly** realizing Peano axioms, recall)

$\lambda z . z \quad \Vdash_{\mathbb{U}} \quad \forall x \forall y (s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y)$

any_term $\Vdash_{\mathbb{U}} \quad \forall x (s(x) \neq 0)$

What about the induction principle?

Why induction is **not** uniformly realized...

(1/2)

Write $A(x) := x = 0 \vee \exists y (x = s(y))$ ("x is either zero or a successor")

Proposition

We have $HA \vdash \forall x A(x)$ but $\not\Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall x A(x)$

Proof. $HA \vdash \forall x A(x)$ by induction, using the induction predicate $A(x)$.

Let us now assume that $t \Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall x A(x)$ for some t , that is: $t \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A(n)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

For each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $t \succ^* \langle \bar{p}_n, u_n \rangle$ for some $p_n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $u_n \in \Lambda$ such that:

- (Left-hand side of the disjunction) either $p_n = 0$ and $u_n \Vdash n = 0$;
- (Right-hand side of the disjunction) either $p_n = 1$ and $u_n \Vdash \exists y (n = s(y))$.

When $n = 0$, the second case is impossible, hence $p_0 = 0$.

And when $n = 1$, the first case is impossible, hence $p_1 = 1$.

From the confluence of \succ , we deduce that $p_0 = 0 = p_1 = 1$: contradiction! \square

Remark: The proof that $\not\Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall x A(x)$ crucially relies on the **confluence of \succ** .
Indeed, if we add a constant \bar{m} (**non-deterministic choice**) with the rules

$$\bar{m} t u \succ t \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{m} t u \succ u \quad (\text{for all terms } t, u)$$

then we easily check that $\bar{m} \langle \bar{0}, \bar{0} \rangle \langle \bar{1}, \bar{0} \rangle \Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall x A(x)$

Why induction is **not** uniformly realized...

(2/2)

Write $A(x) ::= x = 0 \vee \exists y (x = s(y))$ (“ x is either zero or a successor”)

Corollary (An induction axiom that is not uniformly realized)

$\not\|_{\bar{u}} A(0) \wedge \forall x (A(x) \Rightarrow A(s(x))) \Rightarrow \forall x A(x)$ (with $A(x)$ defined as above)

Proof. Assuming that $t \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A(0) \wedge \forall x (A(x) \Rightarrow A(s(x))) \Rightarrow \forall x A(x)$ for some t , we easily deduce that $t \langle \langle \bar{0}, \bar{0} \rangle, \lambda_{-} \langle \bar{1}, \bar{0} \rangle \rangle \Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall x A(x)$: contradiction! \square

Exercise: Assuming the presence of a non-deterministic choice operator \pitchfork in the language of realizers (cf previous slide):

- 1 Define a term t_{nat} such that $t_{\text{nat}} \succ^* \bar{n}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$
- 2 Deduce a term t_{ind} that uniformly realizes all induction axioms
- 3 More generally, construct a “universal realizer” \mathbf{t} (using \pitchfork) such that for each closed formula A :

$$\mathbf{t} \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbf{t} \Vdash A \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbb{N} \models A$$

Conclusion: (uniform) realizability with $\pitchfork = \text{Tarski}$ (in \mathbb{N})

... and how to recover it!

(1/2)

To make the induction principle compatible with uniform realizability, we need to go back to Peano's seminal presentation:

Giuseppe Peano. *Arithmetices principia, nova methodo exposita*. 1889

Axiomata.

1. $1 \in \mathbb{N}$.
2. $a \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset \cdot a = a$.
3. $a, b, c \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset : a = b \cdot = \cdot b = a$.
4. $a, b \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset : a = b \cdot b = c \cdot \supset \cdot a = c$.
5. $a = b \cdot b \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset \cdot a \in \mathbb{N}$.
6. $a \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset \cdot a + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$.
7. $a, b \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset : a = b \cdot = \cdot a + 1 = b + 1$.
8. $a \in \mathbb{N} \cdot \supset \cdot a + 1 - = 1$.
9. $k \in \mathbb{K} \cdot : 1 \in k \cdot : x \in \mathbb{N} \cdot x \in k \cdot \supset \cdot x + 1 \in k \cdot : \supset \cdot \mathbb{N} \supset k$.

... and how to recover it!

(2/2)

To make the induction principle compatible with uniform realizability, we need to go back to Peano's seminal presentation:

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Peano's axioms for arithmetic, using modern notations

1. $1 \in \mathbb{N}$
2. $a \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow a = a$
3. $a, b \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow (a = b \Leftrightarrow b = a)$
4. $a, b, c \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow (a = b \wedge b = c \Rightarrow a = c)$
5. $a = b \wedge b \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow a \in \mathbb{N}$
6. $a \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow a + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$
7. $a, b \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow (a = b \Leftrightarrow a + 1 = b + 1)$
8. $a \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow a + 1 \neq 1$
9. $k \in K \wedge 1 \in k \wedge \forall x (x \in \mathbb{N} \wedge x \in k \Rightarrow x + 1 \in k) \Rightarrow \mathbb{N} \subseteq k$

(where K is the class of all classes)

Open world assumption: \mathbb{N} is only a **subclass** of the universe

Peano relative arithmetic

(1/2)

- To formalize Peano's open world assumption, we introduce a new first-order theory: **Peano relative arithmetic** (PA^{IN})
(As usual, we write HA^{IN} the intuitionistic fragment of PA^{IN})
- The language of $\text{PA}^{\text{IN}}/\text{HA}^{\text{IN}}$ is the language of PA/HA enriched with a unary predicate symbol $x \in \text{IN}$ (“ x is a natural number”)

Language of $\text{PA}^{\text{IN}}/\text{HA}^{\text{IN}}$

FO-terms $e, e_1 ::= x \mid f(e_1, \dots, e_k) \quad (f \text{ of arity } k)$

Formulas $A, B ::= e_1 = e_2 \mid e \in \text{IN} \mid \top \mid \perp \mid A \Rightarrow B$
 $\mid A \wedge B \mid A \vee B \mid \forall x A \mid \exists x A$

(Assuming one function symbol f for each definition of a prim. rec. function)

- **Notations:** $(\forall x \in \text{IN})A(x) ::= \forall x (x \in \text{IN} \Rightarrow A(x))$
 $(\exists x \in \text{IN})A(x) ::= \exists x (x \in \text{IN} \wedge A(x))$

Axioms of $PA^{\mathbb{N}}/HA^{\mathbb{N}}$

Domain of zero and successor

- $0 \in \mathbb{N}$
- $(\forall x \in \mathbb{N})(s(x) \in \mathbb{N})$

Defining equations of all primitive recursive functions in \mathbb{N}

- $(\forall x \in \mathbb{N})(x + 0 = x)$, $(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{N})(x + s(y) = s(x + y))$
- $(\forall x \in \mathbb{N})(x \times 0 = 0)$, $(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{N})(x \times s(y) = x \times y + x)$ (etc.)

Peano axioms, relativized to \mathbb{N}

- $(\forall x, y \in \mathbb{N})(s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y)$
- $(\forall x \in \mathbb{N})(s(x) \neq 0)$
- $\forall \vec{z} [A(\vec{z}, 0) \wedge (\forall x \in \mathbb{N})(A(\vec{z}, x) \Rightarrow A(\vec{z}, s(x)))] \Rightarrow (\forall x \in \mathbb{N})A(\vec{z}, x)]$

From the above axioms, we easily prove that:

Theorem

For each 1st-order term $e(\vec{x})$: $HA^{\mathbb{N}} \vdash (\forall \vec{x} \in \mathbb{N})(e(\vec{x}) \in \mathbb{N})$

Relating PA/HA and PA^{IN}/HA^{IN}

(1/2)

- The relationship between PA/HA and PA^{IN}/HA^{IN} can be studied via a translation $A \mapsto A^{\text{IN}} : \mathcal{L}_{\text{PA}} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{PA}^{\text{IN}}}$ (**relativization to IN**)

Definition of the translation $A \mapsto A^{\text{IN}}$

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \top^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv \top \\
 (e_1 = e_2)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv e_1 = e_2 \\
 (A \wedge B)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv A^{\text{IN}} \wedge B^{\text{IN}} \\
 (\forall x A)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv (\forall x \in \text{IN}) A^{\text{IN}} \\
 \perp^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv \perp \\
 (A \Rightarrow B)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv A^{\text{IN}} \Rightarrow B^{\text{IN}} \\
 (A \vee B)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv A^{\text{IN}} \vee B^{\text{IN}} \\
 (\exists x A)^{\text{IN}} & :\equiv (\exists x \in \text{IN}) A^{\text{IN}}
 \end{array}$$

Theorem

For each $A \in \mathcal{L}_{\text{PA}}$ (closed):

PA \vdash A	iff	PA ^{IN} \vdash A ^{IN}
HA \vdash A	iff	HA ^{IN} \vdash A ^{IN}

- Therefore, the theories PA, PA^{IN}, HA and HA^{IN} are **equiconsistent**:

$$\text{PA}^{\text{IN}} \approx \underbrace{\text{PA} \approx \text{HA}}_{\text{by inclusion and negative translation}} \approx \text{HA}^{\text{IN}}$$

Relating PA/HA and PA^{IN}/HA^{IN}

(2/2)

Proof of the equivalence: $PA \vdash A$ iff $PA^{\text{IN}} \vdash A^{\text{IN}}$.

(Direct implication) We successively prove that

- (1) For all $\Gamma, A \in \mathcal{L}_{PA}$: $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} A$ implies $\Gamma^{\text{IN}}, \vec{x} \in \text{IN} \vdash_{\text{NK}} A^{\text{IN}}$,
writing $\vec{x} = FV(\Gamma, A)$. (Proof: by induction on the derivation.)
- (2) For each axiom A of PA, we have: $HA^{\text{IN}} \vdash A^{\text{IN}}$

The desired implication immediately follows from (1) and (2).

(Converse implication) For each formula A of PA^{IN}, we write $A^{-\text{IN}}$ the formula of PA obtained by replacing in A all subformulas of the form $e \in \text{IN}$ by the trivial formula \top (thus removing relativizations). Then we prove that

- (1) For all $\Gamma, A \in \mathcal{L}_{PA^{\text{IN}}}$: $\Gamma \vdash_{\text{NK}} A$ implies $\Gamma^{-\text{IN}} \vdash_{\text{NK}} A^{-\text{IN}}$
(Proof: by induction on the derivation.)
- (2) For each axiom A of PA^{IN}, we have: $HA \vdash A^{-\text{IN}}$
- (3) For each closed formula $A \in \mathcal{L}_{PA}$: $\vdash_{\text{NJ}} (A^{\text{IN}})^{-\text{IN}} \Leftrightarrow A$
(Proof: by induction on A)

Finally, assuming that $PA^{\text{IN}} \vdash A^{\text{IN}}$, we deduce that $PA \vdash (A^{\text{IN}})^{-\text{IN}}$ (from (1) and (2)), and conclude that $PA \vdash A$ (from (3)).The corresponding equivalence for HA/HA^{IN} is proved similarly. □

HA^{IN} and uniform realizability

(1/2)

- We extend the relation $t \Vdash_u A$ to the new predicate $x \in \mathbb{IN}$:

$$t \Vdash_u e \in \mathbb{IN} \quad :\equiv \quad t \succ^* \overline{e^{\mathbb{IN}}} \quad (= \text{the value of } e \text{ as a } \lambda\text{-term})$$

- We observe that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 t \Vdash_u \underbrace{\forall x (x \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow A(x))}_{\text{Relativized } \forall} & \text{ iff } \forall n (t \Vdash_u n \in \mathbb{IN} \Rightarrow A(n)) \\
 & \text{ iff } \forall n \forall u (u \succ^* \bar{n} \Rightarrow t u \Vdash_u A(n)) \\
 & \text{ iff } \underbrace{\forall n (t \bar{n} \Vdash_u A(n))}_{\text{Kleene's non-uniform interpretation of } \forall}
 \end{aligned}$$

Kleene's non-uniform interpretation of \forall

$$\begin{aligned}
 t \Vdash_u \underbrace{\exists x (x \in \mathbb{IN} \wedge A(x))}_{\text{Relativized } \exists} & \text{ iff } \exists n (t \Vdash_u n \in \mathbb{IN} \wedge A(n)) \\
 & \text{ iff } \exists n \exists u \exists v (t \succ^* \langle u, v \rangle \wedge u \succ^* \bar{n} \wedge v \Vdash_u A(n)) \\
 & \text{ iff } \underbrace{\exists n \exists v (t \succ^* \langle \bar{n}, v \rangle \wedge v \Vdash_u A(n))}_{\text{Kleene's non-uniform interpretation of } \exists}
 \end{aligned}$$

Kleene's non-uniform interpretation of \exists

- Conclusion:** Relativized uniform $\forall/\exists =$ Non-uniform \forall/\exists

HA^{IN} and uniform realizability

(2/2)

Lemma (Uniformly realizing the axioms of HA^{IN})All the axioms of HA^{IN} are uniformly realized:

$$0 \Vdash_{\bar{u}} 0 \in \mathbf{IN}$$

$$\lambda x. s(x) \Vdash_{\bar{u}} (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN}) s(x) \in \mathbf{IN}$$

$$\lambda -. 0 \Vdash_{\bar{u}} (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN})(x + 0 = 0)$$

$$\lambda -, -. 0 \Vdash_{\bar{u}} (\forall x, y \in \mathbf{IN})(x + s(y) = s(x + y)) \quad (\text{etc. for each } f)$$

⋮

$$\lambda x, y, z. z \Vdash_{\bar{u}} (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN})(s(x) = s(y) \Rightarrow x = y)$$

$$\text{any_term} \Vdash_{\bar{u}} (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN})(s(x) \neq 0)$$

$$\text{rec} \Vdash_{\bar{u}} \forall \vec{y} [A(\vec{y}, 0) \Rightarrow (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN})(A(\vec{y}, x) \Rightarrow A(\vec{y}, s(x))) \Rightarrow (\forall x \in \mathbf{IN})A(\vec{y}, x)]$$

(writing $\text{rec} := \lambda z_0, z_1, x. \text{rec}(z_0, z_1, x)$)**Proof:** ExerciseTherefore, all theorems of HA^{IN} are **uniformly** realized:**Theorem (Soundness):** If $\text{HA}^{\mathbf{IN}} \vdash A$, then $t \Vdash_{\bar{u}} A$ for some t

Kleene realizability vs uniform realizability

Remark: The uniform realizers of the axioms of $PA^{\mathbb{N}}$ are essentially the same as the Kleene realizers of the axioms of PA .

This is due to the following result:

Proposition (Kleene realizability vs uniform realizability)

For all closed formulas A of HA and for all closed λ -terms t :

$$t \Vdash A \quad \text{iff} \quad t \Vdash_{\mathbb{U}} A^{\mathbb{N}}$$

Proof. By induction on the size of A

(Exercise)

Conclusion: Kleene realiz. = Uniform realiz. $\circ (A \mapsto A^{\mathbb{N}})$

Moreover, the following diagram commutes:

(Exercise)

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 d : (\Gamma \vdash_{NJ} A) & \xrightarrow{(-)^{\mathbb{N}}} & d^{\mathbb{N}} : (\Gamma^{\mathbb{N}}, \vec{x} \in \mathbb{N} \vdash_{NJ} A^{\mathbb{N}}) \\
 \downarrow (-)^* & & \downarrow (-)^{\circ} \\
 d^* & \xlongequal{\quad\quad\quad} & (d^{\mathbb{N}})^{\circ}
 \end{array}
 \quad \text{(where } \vec{x} = FV(\Gamma, A)\text{)}$$

Conclusion

- The equivalence $t \Vdash A$ iff $t \Vdash_{\mathbb{N}} A^{\mathbb{N}}$ implies that:

For all $A \in \mathcal{L}_{PA}$ and $t \in \Lambda$ (closed):

$$t \Vdash \forall x A(x) \quad \text{iff} \quad t \Vdash_{\mathbb{N}} \forall x (x \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow A^{\mathbb{N}}(x))$$

$$t \Vdash \exists x A(x) \quad \text{iff} \quad t \Vdash_{\mathbb{N}} \exists x (x \in \mathbb{N} \wedge A^{\mathbb{N}}(x))$$

- Conclusion:** Non-uniform quant. = relativized uniform quant.:

$$(\text{non-uniform}) \forall x A(x) = (\text{uniform}) \forall x \underbrace{(D(x) \Rightarrow A(x))}_{\text{type of functions}}$$

$$(\text{non-uniform}) \exists x A(x) = (\text{uniform}) \exists x \underbrace{(D(x) \wedge A(x))}_{\text{type of pairs}}$$

where $D(x)$ is the domain of quantification

- Uniform realizability appears to be more primitive than Kleene's
 \Rightarrow In what follows, we shall systematically use uniform realizability
 (while introducing the needed relativization predicates)

A SKELETON in the (intuitionistic) closet... (1/3)

It is well-known that the following equivalences hold in NJ/NK

$$\forall x (A(x) \wedge B(x)) \Leftrightarrow \forall x A(x) \wedge \forall x B(x) \quad (\text{Commutation } \forall/\wedge)$$

$$\exists x (A(x) \vee B(x)) \Leftrightarrow \exists x A(x) \vee \exists x B(x) \quad (\text{Commutation } \exists/\vee)$$

whereas in LJ/LK, we only have the implications

$$\forall x (A(x) \vee B(x)) \Leftarrow \forall x A(x) \vee \forall x B(x) \quad (\forall/\vee \Leftarrow \vee/\forall)$$

$$\exists x (A(x) \wedge B(x)) \Rightarrow \exists x A(x) \wedge \forall x B(x) \quad (\exists/\wedge \Rightarrow \wedge/\exists)$$

The converse implications do not hold... Really?

Proposition (The 'scandalous commutation' \forall/\vee)

Given formulas $A(x)$ and $B(x)$ depending only on x , we have:

$$\langle \lambda z . z, \lambda z . z \rangle \Vdash_{\mathbf{u}} \forall x (A(x) \vee B(x)) \Leftrightarrow \forall x A(x) \vee \forall x B(x)$$

Proof. Just check that both sides of \Leftrightarrow have the same uniform realizers. \square

Note: The dual commutation \exists/\wedge is not uniformly realizable

A SKELETON in the (intuitionistic) closet... (2/3)

The 'scandalous commutation' \forall/\forall also holds in all (parametrically) polymorphic functional languages (ML, Haskell), where both types

$$\forall\alpha.(\tau(\alpha) + \sigma(\alpha)) \quad \text{and} \quad (\forall\alpha.\tau(\alpha)) + (\forall\alpha.\sigma(\alpha))$$

have (at least morally) the same inhabitants

Nevertheless, we can observe that:

- 1 In classical logic, the commutation \forall/\forall trivializes the universe:

Proposition: $\text{LK} + \text{comm}(\forall/\forall) \vdash \forall x \forall y (x = y)$

Proof. Classically, we have:

	$\forall x \forall y (x = y \vee x \neq y)$	(by excluded middle)
hence	$\forall x (\forall y (x = y) \vee \forall y (x \neq y))$	(by $\text{comm}(\forall/\forall)$)
and since	$\neg \forall y (x \neq y)$	(take $y = x$ as a counter example)
we get:	$\forall x \forall y (x = y)$	□

So that all non-trivial classical theories (PA, ZF, ...) refute the commutation \forall/\forall

A **SKELETON** in the (intuitionistic) closet...

(3/3)

- ② The commutation \forall/\forall is compatible with HA^{IN}

Proposition: The theory $\text{HA}^{\text{IN}} + \text{comm}(\forall/\forall)$ is consistent

Proof. All axioms of HA^{IN} are universally realized, as well as $\text{comm}(\forall/\forall)$. □

- ③ The commutation \forall/\forall is **incompatible** with HA

Proposition: The theory $\text{HA} + \text{comm}(\forall/\forall)$ is **inconsistent**

Proof. We observe that:

$$\text{HA} \vdash \forall x (x = 0 \vee \exists y (x = s(y)))$$

hence $\text{HA} + \text{comm}(\forall/\forall) \vdash \forall x (x = 0) \vee \forall x \exists y (x = s(y))$

But since $\text{HA} \vdash \neg \forall x (x = 0)$

and since $\text{HA} \vdash \neg \forall x \exists y (x = s(y))$

we get: $\text{HA} + \text{comm}(\forall/\forall) \vdash \perp$ □

Remark: The commutation \forall/\forall remains compatible with all intuitionistic theories where quantifiers can be interpreted uniformly: HA^{IN} , IZ, IZF (etc.)

Plan

- 1 Kleene realizability
- 2 Gödel-Gentzen negative translation
- 3 Uniformity and relativization
- 4 Lafont-Reus-Streicher negative translation**

Kleene realizability and negative translations (recall, 1/2)

Recall: Classical proofs can be turned into programs, by composing Kleene realizability with a negative translation. For example:

Gödel-Gentzen translation $A \mapsto A^G$ (Recall)

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \top^G & \equiv \top & \perp^G & \equiv \perp \\
 (A \Rightarrow B)^G & \equiv A^G \Rightarrow B^G & (e_1 = e_2)^G & \equiv \neg\neg(e_1 = e_2) \\
 (A \wedge B)^G & \equiv A^G \wedge B^G & (A \vee B)^G & \equiv \neg(\neg A^G \wedge \neg B^G) \\
 (\forall x A)^G & \equiv \forall x A^G & (\exists x A)^G & \equiv \neg\forall x \neg A^G
 \end{array}$$

Theorem (Soundness)

- 1 LK $\vdash A^G \Leftrightarrow A$
- 2 If $d : (PA \vdash A)$, then $d^G : (HA \vdash A^G)$

• **Problem:** A^G is always Harrop; therefore:

- ▶ Extracted λ -term $(d^G)^*$ has no computational contents
- ▶ Kleene $\circ (A \mapsto A^G)$ mimics Tarski: $\Vdash A^G$ iff $\text{IN} \models A$

Kleene realizability and negative translations (recall, 2/2)

Friedman's R -translation $A \mapsto A^F$ (Recall)

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \top^F & ::= \top & \perp^F & ::= R \\
 (A \Rightarrow B)^F & ::= A^F \Rightarrow B^F & (e_1 = e_2)^F & ::= \neg_R \neg_R (e_1 = e_2) \\
 (A \wedge B)^F & ::= A^F \wedge B^F & (A \vee B)^F & ::= \neg_R (\neg_R A^F \wedge \neg_R B^F) \\
 (\forall x A)^F & ::= \forall x A^F & (\exists x A)^F & ::= \neg_R \forall x \neg_R A^F \\
 & (\text{if } x \notin FV(R)) & & (\text{if } x \notin FV(R))
 \end{array}$$

writing: $\neg_R A ::= A \Rightarrow R$, where R is the **return formula**Theorem (Soundness & Π_1^0 -conservativity)

- 1 If $d : (PA \vdash A)$, then $d^F : (HA \vdash A^F)$ (for any return formula R)
- 2 Given $A \equiv \forall x \exists y f(x, y) = 0$ (Π_1^0 -formula)
If $d : (PA \vdash A)$, then **F-trick**(d^G) : $(HA \vdash A)$ (using a suitable R)

- **Pro:** In the Π_1^0 -case, the program $(F\text{-trick}(d^F))^*$ does the expected job
- **Contra:** The translation $d \mapsto d^F$ completely changes the structure of the underlying proof. **Possible fix:** cf next slides

The Lafont-Reus-Streicher negative translation

(1/2)

The Lafont-Reus-Streicher (LRS) translation works across two languages:

- **Source language:** A minimal language for classical logic:

Formulas $A, B ::= p(e_1, \dots, e_k) \mid \perp \mid A \Rightarrow B \mid \forall x A$
(no equality, no arithmetic – remaining constructions defined by De Morgan laws)

(+ deduction rules of LK)

- **Target language:** The usual language of LJ

Principle of the LRS-translation: Translate each formula A (of the source language) into two formulas (of the target language):

- A formula A^\perp (target language) representing the negation of A
- A formula A^{LRS} (target language) representing A itself

Moreover, A^{LRS} is uniformly defined by $A^{\text{LRS}} := \neg_R A^\perp \equiv A^\perp \Rightarrow R$, where R is the return formula that parameterizes the construction

The Lafont-Reus-Streicher negative translation

(2/2)

- To every predicate symbol p (source language) we associate a predicate symbol \bar{p} (target language) representing the negation of p
- The translations $A \mapsto A^\perp$ and $A \mapsto A^{\text{LRS}}$ (source \rightarrow target) are defined by mutual recursion as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (p(e_1, \dots, e_k))^\perp &::= \bar{p}(e_1, \dots, e_k) & \perp^\perp &::= \top \\
 (A \Rightarrow B)^\perp &::= A^{\text{LRS}} \wedge B^\perp & (\forall x A)^\perp &::= \exists x A^\perp \\
 A^{\text{LRS}} &::= \neg_R A^\perp & \equiv & A^\perp \Rightarrow R
 \end{aligned}$$

Theorem (Soundness)

- (1) When $R \equiv \perp$, and under the axioms $\forall \vec{x} (p(\vec{x}) \Leftrightarrow \bar{p}(\vec{x}))$ (for all p, \bar{p})
 $\text{LK} + \text{axioms} \vdash A^\perp \Leftrightarrow \neg A$ and $\text{LK} + \text{axioms} \vdash A^{\text{LRS}} \Leftrightarrow A$
- (2) If $\text{LK} \vdash A$, then $\text{LJ} \vdash A^{\text{LRS}}$ (independently from the formula R)

Proof: (1) By induction on A
 (2) By induction on the derivation

(Exercise)

Computational interpretation

- **Intuition:** The translated formula A^\perp represents the **type of stacks** opposing (classical) terms of type A :

$$(A_1 \Rightarrow \dots \Rightarrow A_n \Rightarrow B)^\perp \equiv A_1^{\text{LRS}} \wedge \dots \wedge A_n^{\text{LRS}} \wedge B^\perp$$

$$(A_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow A_n \rightarrow B)^\perp \equiv A_1^{\text{LRS}} \times \dots \times A_n^{\text{LRS}} \times B^\perp$$

- To analyze the computational contents of the LRS-translation, we now need to work across two λ -calculi:

- A source calculus to represent **classical proofs**:

$$\lambda_{\text{source}} = \lambda_{\rightarrow} + \alpha : ((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A \quad (\text{Peirce's law})$$

(Polymorphic constant α introduces classical reasoning)

- An intuitionistic target calculus to represent translated proofs:

$$\lambda_{\text{target}} = \lambda_{\rightarrow, \times}$$

(In this calculus, pairs are used to represent stacks)

The source λ -calculus($\{\perp, \Rightarrow, \forall\}$ -fragment of LK)

Syntax (Minimal fragment of LK)

Types	$A, B ::= \perp \mid p(e_1, \dots, e_k) \mid A \Rightarrow B \mid \forall x A$
Proof-terms	$t, u ::= z \mid \lambda z. t \mid tu \mid \mathfrak{c}$

- Classical logic obtained by introducing an inert constant \mathfrak{c} (call/cc) for **Peirce's law** (taken as an axiom) \Rightarrow No reduction rule!
- Constructions $\top, \wedge, \vee, \exists$ encoded using De Morgan laws (= full LK)

Typing rules

$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash z : A} \quad (z:A) \in \Gamma$	$\Gamma \vdash \mathfrak{c} : ((A \Rightarrow B) \Rightarrow A) \Rightarrow A$
$\frac{\Gamma, z : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda z. t : A \Rightarrow B}$	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B}$
$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A}{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma)$	$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall x A}{\Gamma \vdash t : A[x := e]} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \perp}{\Gamma \vdash t : A}$

Note: \forall is treated uniformly: $\forall x A(x) \approx \bigcap_x A(x)$ (no function argument!)

The target λ -calculus($\{\top, \Rightarrow, \wedge, \exists\}$ -fragment of LJ)

Syntax (Fragment of LJ)

Types $A, B ::= \top \mid \bar{p}(e_1, \dots, e_k) \mid A \Rightarrow B \mid A \wedge B \mid \exists x A$ **Proof-terms** $t, u ::= z \mid \lambda z. t \mid tu \mid \langle t, u \rangle \mid \pi_1(t) \mid \pi_2(t)$

+ usual reduction rules for proof-terms

Typing rules

$$\overline{\Gamma \vdash z : A} \quad (z:A) \in \Gamma$$

$$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t : \top} \quad FV(t) \subseteq \text{dom}(\Gamma)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, z : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda z. t : A \Rightarrow B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \Rightarrow B \quad \Gamma \vdash u : A}{\Gamma \vdash tu : B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \quad \Gamma \vdash t : B}{\Gamma \vdash \langle t, u \rangle : A \wedge B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \wedge B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_1(t) : A} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A \wedge B}{\Gamma \vdash \pi_2(t) : B}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : A[x := e]}{\Gamma \vdash t : \exists x A}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, z : A \vdash t : B}{\Gamma, z : \exists x A \vdash t : B} \quad x \notin FV(\Gamma, B)$$

Note: \exists treated uniformly: $\exists x A(x) \approx \bigcup_x A(x)$

(no witness!)

The Lafont-Reus-Streicher logical translation

- The logical translation $A \mapsto A^{\text{LRS}}$

$$\begin{aligned} (p(e_1, \dots, e_k))^{\perp} &::= \bar{p}(e_1, \dots, e_k) & \perp^{\perp} &::= \top \\ (A \Rightarrow B)^{\perp} &::= A^{\text{LRS}} \wedge B^{\perp} & (\forall x A)^{\perp} &::= \exists x A^{\perp} \\ A^{\text{LRS}} &::= \neg_R A^{\perp} \end{aligned}$$

corresponds to a program transformation on untyped proof terms, called a **continuation-passing style** (CPS) translation:

$$\begin{aligned} (z)^{\text{LRS}} &::= \lambda s. z s & (\text{cc})^{\text{LRS}} &::= \lambda \langle z, s_0 \rangle. z \langle k_{s_0}, s_0 \rangle \\ (\lambda z. t)^{\text{LRS}} &::= \lambda \langle z, s_0 \rangle. t^{\text{LRS}}_{s_0} & \text{where } k_s &::= \lambda \langle z, - \rangle. z s \\ (tu)^{\text{LRS}} &::= \lambda s_0. t^{\text{LRS}} \langle u^{\text{LRS}}, s_0 \rangle \end{aligned}$$

Note: $\lambda \langle z, s \rangle. t$ defined as $\lambda z_0. (\lambda z s. t) (\pi_1(z_0)) (\pi_2(z_0))$

Theorem (Soundness)

If	$\Gamma \vdash t : A$	(in the source λ -calculus)
then	$\Gamma^{\text{LRS}} \vdash t^{\text{LRS}} : A^{\text{LRS}}$	(in the target λ -calculus)

Computational analysis

- Given a term $t : A$ and a “stack” $s : A^\perp$ (in the target calculus), we use the notation $t @ s \equiv t s$ (application of t to the stack s)
- We observe that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\lambda z . t)^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u, s \rangle &\equiv (\lambda \langle z, s_0 \rangle . t^{\text{LRS}} s_0) @ \langle u, s \rangle \\
 \gamma^* &t^{\text{LRS}} [z := u] @ s
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 (t u)^{\text{LRS}} @ s &\equiv (\lambda s_0 . t^{\text{LRS}} \langle u^{\text{LRS}}, s_0 \rangle) s \\
 \gamma^* &t^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u^{\text{LRS}}, s \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \kappa^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u, s \rangle &\equiv (\lambda \langle z, s_0 \rangle . z \langle k_{s_0}, s_0 \rangle) @ \langle u, s \rangle \\
 \gamma^* &u @ \langle k_s, s \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 k_s @ \langle u, s' \rangle &\equiv (\lambda \langle z, - \rangle . z s) @ \langle u, s' \rangle \\
 \gamma^* &u @ s
 \end{aligned}$$

Towards the Krivine abstract machine

- From the computational behavior of translated proof terms t^{LRS} ...

$$\begin{array}{lcl}
 (\lambda z . t)^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u, s \rangle & \Vdash & t^{\text{LRS}}[z := u] @ s \\
 (tu)^{\text{LRS}} @ s & \Vdash & t^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u^{\text{LRS}}, s \rangle \\
 (\mathfrak{C})^{\text{LRS}} @ \langle u, s \rangle & \Vdash & u @ \langle k_s, s \rangle \\
 k_s @ \langle u, s' \rangle & \Vdash & u @ s
 \end{array}$$

... we deduce evaluation rules for classical proof terms:

Krivine Abstract Machine (KAM)

Grab	$\lambda z . t \star u \cdot \pi$	\Vdash	$t[z := u] \star \pi$
Push	$tu \star \pi$	\Vdash	$t \star u \cdot \pi$
Save	$\mathfrak{C} \star u \cdot \pi$	\Vdash	$u \star k_\pi \cdot \pi$
Restore	$k_\pi \star u \cdot \pi'$	\Vdash	$u \star \pi$

- Reformulating Kleene realizability through the LRS translation (and its CPS), we get **Krivine classical realizability** (cf next talk)