Wojtek Jamroga - Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

Abstract:
We present a game-theoretic approach to coercion-resistance from the point of view of an honest election authority that chooses between various protection methods with different levels of resistance and different implementation costs. We give a simple game model of the election and propose a preliminary analysis. It turns out that, in the
games that we look at, Stackelberg equilibrium for the society does not coincide with maxmin, and it is always more attractive to the society than Nash equilibrium. This suggests that the society is better off if the security policy is publicly announced, and the authorities commit to it.

Bio:
Wojtek Jamroga is an associate professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, Poland. His research focuses on modeling, specification and verification of interaction between agents. Currently, he works mainly on applying logic-based specification and verification techniques to information security requirements for voting protocols, in particular on formalizations of confidentiality, coercion-resistance, and voter-verifiability in e-voting protocols.

Prof. Jamroga obtained his PhD from the University of Twente, Netherlands in 2004, and completed his habilitation at the Clausthal University of Technology, Germany in 2009. He has coauthored almost 100 refereed publications, and has been a Program Committee member of most important conferences and workshops in AI and multi-agent systems. In 2016, he got the Best Paper Award at the main European conference on electronic voting E-VOTE-ID 2016. His teaching record includes courses at ESSLLI (European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information), and EASSS (European Agent Systems Summer School), all of them on logical aspects of multi-agent systems.